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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.
THE INNOCENCE AND GUILT OF SCIENCE.
ROBERT A. BUDINGTON.
The Ohio Academy of Science is now gathered for its
forty-third annual meeting. If we may break away from
its seriousness for the moment we may facetiously doff the
present dinner occasion as its forty-third birthday party.
At a time when an essentially unavoidable epidemic of town-
ship, municipal, and institutional centenaries is being cele-
brated, a mere 43 years makes our organization seem scarcely
more than adolescent. This need not make us apologetic,
however; quite otherwise, for no publicist, or other megaphone-
manipulator of obvious facts fails to re-announce the well-worn
doctrine that the hope of civilization is in the hands of youth.
We confidently assert that the 143rd annual Academy meeting
will be magnificent, far more consequential than the present
occasion!
Personally, I cannot avoid wondering, very sympathetically,
what subject upon which to address his audience the 143rd
Academy president may select. On second thought, however,
it is quite possible, probably probable, that wisdom and courage
will have accumulated by that time to a degree resulting in
the forbidding of this recurring speech imposition! But,
unhappily for you, and for me, that date is too far in the future
to get any amendment into control of the present occasion.
We are both "in for it," for the next several minutes: you must
swallow the "bitter pill"—and bravely attempt to keep lower
jaws from dropping, as you do so, or ears from drooping!
In the earlier days, as our records show, when there was only
a section devoted to biological subjects, an officer could frame
up something to say along the special line of that interest.
Gradually, as the accretion-like growth of the Academy has
proceeded, the variety of sciences now gathered under its
banner has so increased that a specialized subject is practically
sure to bore a majority of our total group; hence, the Academy
audience, gathered for an optional dinner, but consequently
in essentially compulsory attendance on the speech following,
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demands discussion of a comprehensive topic, one applying
to all branches of science. I do not know when such a problem
has been more successfully solved than it was by your last year's
president, Professor Alpheas F. Smith. My temptation was
to just read his address to you, again, this evening; we all
would have been the gainers.
After not a little deliberation, mostly during last summer,
I decided to adopt the subject I have, "The Innocence and
Guilt of Science." For a long time I had felt repeatedly peeved,
when, on occasion, in reading and in conversation, the spirit
and service of science was subjected to a process of mud-
throwing, and other shallow-minded abuse: everyone of this
audience has felt similar resentment. Then, as the autumn
came on, the newly invented words, "technocracy," "techno-
crat" and their ilk were foisted on an unprepared public,
and the noise of their machinery became so deafening and
offensive that my title was abandoned—permanently— as I
thought. After a while, however—and as you know—the
engineering departments at Columbia, and their collaborators,
engaged in a wholly worth-while and admirable "Energy-
Survey," found they had been caught unawares, sucked into a
vortex; in other words, were being "strung" by a strangely
clever statistical legerdemainist; they escaped from his clutches
by firing him; Simeon Strunsky and others came to the rescue
as meditators between the "Energy-Survey" and the public—
and the situation was saved, or at least relieved. In my own
predicament, as the term "technocracy" became less frequent
and nauseating, courage gradually returned, my partial delibera-
tions about the "innocence of science" were pulled out of the
ashes, and are now being stuffed into your ears.
Before going further, let me undeceive anyone who imagines
that science really needs any defense, or that I think so. The
fact is, however, that we are often so illogical and temporarily
confused that a kind of misunderstanding, or misconception
of things creeps into our analysis of them. The speaker does
not nurse the idea that it lies within the scope of his ability to
"make the crooked ways straight, and the rough places plain."
Hard work or thought after a hearty banquet like this is
inadvisable (I take refuge in that theory), so I only aspire to
augment your gastric satisfaction by offering a sort of after-
dinner mint of not too objectionable a flavor.
The actual subject matter of science was present and has
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descended to us from an infinitely remote past, of course.
'' Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hads't
formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to
everlasting," the elements of force, and of substance (if there
is any such thing) were pursuing a behavior, a relationship
of cause and effect, en masse, and as electrons and the like,
which we little men are still puzzling over and as yet do not
fathom or understand except in the most fractional way.
Science, as a body of observed fact, has also been in existence,
"on the road," as we say, a very long time. In the sense in
which the term is generally used, however, it can hardly be
dated back to a beginning antedating the arrival of more-or-less
intelligent man; for, like sound, it does not exist save as an
experience of man, to which the term is applied. Needless to
say, the facts of nature, all its bases and laws as we call them,
have existed and been in operation ever since eternity began,
if we may use that paradoxical phrase; while Science, which
etymologically implies "things known," or knowledge, pre-
supposes a knower; and any critically recognized, and organized,
and appreciated body of facts we believe to be the possession
and experience of only the one genus, Homo. Perhaps so far
as evidence goes, we should concede to the Neanderthalers the
credit for being the earliest observers, the earliest formulators of
scientific knowledge, and the earliest ones to use what we think
of as "applied Science;" in other words, they were the first
"technocrats." The scientists among them recognized the
seasons, no doubt, correlated with differing lengths of day and
night or the dropping of leaves from deciduous trees as the
frosts came on; the fact of gravity as revealed by weight of
rocks and limbs and the running down hill of water; they knew
the cleavage qualities of flint stones; the principles of balance
and symmetry in their arrows and spears; they must have
known much of anatomy of the animals they killed and ate; and
doubtless something of the therapeutic values of the bark and
leaves of particular kinds of trees, or herbs.
From still another angle, science, as organized knowledge,
is thought of as emerging from the limbo of a less remote past,
i. e., Homo, or Homines, made deductions, or practical applica-
tions along lines which have definitely come down to us in
recorded language. Approximately, astronomy dates from
Thales (650 B. C.?), who determined the length of the year
and studied eclipses, and Anaximander (611 B. C.) who invented
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the sun-dial. Anaximander is also one of the fathers of
geography, in that he made a map of the world, however
erroneous it was. He also took a hand at biological philosophy
and framed up a ''theory" of evolution. Pythagoras, also
of the 6th century, B. C, reasoned the earth to be spherical,
and, as a related subject, formulated many important mathe-
matical theorems. Xenophanes, a contemporary of Pythagoras,
was one of the earliest palaeontologists. Leucippus, whose
dates are obscure but probably in the fifth century B. C,
practically comprehended the atomic theory. Hippocrates
the 2nd (460 B. C.) was the first real pathologist. Plato
(429 B. C.) was one of the earliest to see the overlap of natural
science on philosophy, and his pupil, Aristotle (384 B. C.) was
the father of zoology, though he should also be accorded
paternal relation especially to astronomy, including meteorology.
Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil, with his description of more
than 500 species of plants, merits being called the "pater
noster" of botany, while Archimedes, of the third century,
B.C., the great student of inclined planes and thus the inventor
of the screw, is one of the earliest devotees of mechanics.
Now, I have cited the above samples from the archives of
scientific history purposely. Ah, those were the "good old
days," when the motive of men who dealt with nature was
pure and undefiled by any thought of the practical applications,
the selling values of their discoveries, the temptation to take
out patents, the dreams of recognition. Yes, those men,
along with their contemporaries and followers for a few
centuries, were real scientists: their interest was spontaneous,
they were impelled by no inferior motives; their results were
accepted as interesting, and, while not unchallenged, they
were respected as scholars, as contributors to the general
welfare of mankind. They studied Nature for its own sake;
yes, "Those were the good old days!" I remind you of these
men, their work and their place in the history of science
because such reference furnishes a basis for a first articulation
with the subject chosen for this talk.
No field of intellectual interest and endeavor has been
subjected to such a deluge of earnest opprobrium and
unqualified reproach, especially during the last fifteen years,
as has science. At its feet has been laid the major responsi-
bility for most of the present misery of mankind the world
over. It is blamed for trie very possibility of war, in large
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measure, of course, because of the instruments of war—
mechanical, chemical, bacteriological, and for the consequent
endless complexity of international relations, indebtedness, and
the uncertain character of the centuries ahead. It is blamed
for the possibility of easy and rapid production, and thus
of over-production; for the consequent unemployment situation
and its accompanying human misery and staggering sociological
problems; for the one-time disruption of the horse-breeding,
wagon, and coach industries; later for the dismantling of
unnumbered thousands of miles of electric railways, and now
for the actual or approaching bankruptcy of our steam-railway
systems. Science is held accountable for the relative ruin
of the wool industry, the silk industry—while the recent
revelation of the inherent possibilities in the nettle is pro-
claimed as fatal to half the total textile industry of the world.
Large sheaves of further verdicts have been voted by the jury
of our fellow-men, who have been bamboozled into thinking
that the newly-born cult of technocrats is identical with the
quiet associates in scientific research. This charge such a
group as the Ohio Academy of Science, and all other similar
organizations, as such or as individuals, vigorously resents.
In saying this the defense is made, of course, on behalf of
science as such, i. e., pure science, and on behalf of those who
work in the spirit of Thales, and Hippocrates, and Leucippus:
there is not in mind the application of scientifically established
facts. True scientists "do not simply handle phenomena
and describe or utilize them for some practical purpose, but
explain them and show their correlations." This distinction
has been further well pointed out by the late Thomas Hunt
Montgomery.1 He says:
"There is an enormous mental difference between the pure
technologist and the pure scientist. We do not wish to imply,
for instance, that the mind of the pure mathematician is higher
than the mind of the engineer, for they are rather comple-
mental; but the former is a scientist and the latter is not,,
in that the former seeks interpretations and the latter applica-
tions. A physicist is scientific so long as he keeps in mind
explanations, but not when he simply constructs apparatus.
In the same way there are two very different kinds of men
interested in the microscope: one constructs it, but he is not*a
XT. H. Montgomery: "The Aesthetic Element in Scientific Thought." Annual
address by President, Texas Academy of Science, 1905.
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scientist no matter how excellent a technician he may be; the
scientist is he who patiently reasons and imagines with his eye
at the ocular. There is an enormous difference between the
technical expert and the scientific interpreter, for the first
builds apparatus, makes use of phenomena; while the second
tries to relate the phenomena and bring them together into
certain broad generalizations. If there is a particular group
which may be sharply defined, it is the group of minds interested
in mechanical constructions. But it is an egregious error to
rank these and scientists together: they are rather to be con-
sidered as entirely divergent both in work and aims. Scientists
need to use apparatus, they are obliged sometimes to invent it;
however, this apparatus is not of primary interest to them, but
simply a tool: they look ahead, far beyond the means employed."
The foregoing thesis could be supported by innumerable
illustrations. Columbus was completely possessed by the
then-theory that the world is spherical, and that India could
be reached by sailing westward as well as eastward; he saw
many evidences in support of his theory; he wanted to establish
the fact; he was not at all primarily interested in buying and
selling Indian goods. He blundered into America, and proved
it to be a fact; but no one thinks of blaming poor old Columbus
for the rise and fall of Florida real estate, or for the administra-
tion of Jimmie Walker, even if they have occurred in the field
of his discovery.
Among his innumerable other accomplishments, Benjamin
Franklin flew his kite and toyed with lightning; but no poor
devil has yet blamed him for the electric chair. Llewenhoek
is not accountable for the inhuman use of bacteria in war;
it's not the responsibility of the Wright Brothers that Lowell
Bayles met his death at the Detroit Flying Field; Street (1794)
committed no crime because your internal combustion engine
responded to your foot as you got sleepy and smashed your auto
against the telephone pole. Conversely, pure scientists must
forego the credit which is due the inventors and the tech-
nologists for assembling their results into the innumerable
forms which bless mankind. Their turning of laboriously-won
scientific facts into such combinations and machine-forms as
can serve useful ends is a wholly laudable occupation in its
own right, but it is nevertheless true that the bona fide scientific
investigator and the inventor of commercially saleable utilities
are seldom combined in the same person. Insight and brilliancy
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in one of these occupations is generally associated with
mediocrity, or less, in the other. Nevertheless, it is probably
true that a majority of people, not a few scientists included,
fail to discriminate clearly between these two mental powers,
and confuse the scientific investigator with the technologist;
such are numb to the shifting of their intellectual currents,
e. g., as they pass from the data of the physiological chemist
and chick embryologist to those of the incubator manufacturer;
from the laboratory of Professor John Abel, the isolator of
epinephrin, to the factory for making chocolate-covered pills;
from the laboratories of Klebs and Loeffler to the bottling
department of Sharp and Dohme, or Parke Davis & Co.;
from the synthesis of nitroglycerin to the dynamite factories
of the DuPonts. The phenomenon of a combination investi-
gator and inventor, as has been intimated, does occasionally
occur as a "rara avis." One at once cites the accomplishments
of Edison, and, long before him, Watt. But they are exceptions;
as a rule, a man is Dr. Jeckyl, let us say, most of the time,
and only momentarily Mr. Hyde, or vice versa.
Appealing again to an authority whose words will multiply
the seriousness of my contention many-fold, let me quote from
one of America's one-time great mathematical sons, Simon
Newcomb.2 At the opening of the International Congress
of Arts and Sciences at the Universal Exposition in St. Louis
(1904), he said, in commenting on the remarkable achievements
of the 19th century, "The superficial observer, who sees the
oak but forgets the acorn, might feel as though the special
qualities which have brought out such great results are expert
scientific knowledge and rare ingenuity, directed to the applica-
tion of the powers of steam and electricity. From this point
of view, the great inventors and the great captains of industry
were the first agents in bringing about the modern era. But
the more careful inquirer will see that the work of these men
was possible only through a knowledge of the laws of nature,
which had been gained by men whose work took precedence
of theirs in logical order, and that success in invention has
been measured by completeness in such knowledge. While
giving all due honor to the great inventors, let us remember
that the first place is that of the great investigators whose
2Simon Newcomb: "The Evolution of the Scientific Investigator." Opening
address, International Congress of Arts and Science Universal Exposition, St.
Louis, 1904.
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forceful intellects opened the way to secrets previously hidden
from men. Let it be an honor and not a reproach to these
men that they were not actuated by the love of gain, and did
not keep utilitarian ends in view in the pursuit of their
researches. If it seems that in neglecting such ends they
were leaving undone the most important part of their work,
let us remember that nature turns a forbidding face to those
who pay her court with the hope of gain, and is responsive only
to those suitors whose love for her is pure and undefiled. Not
only is the special genius required in the investigator, not that
generally best adapted to applying the discoveries which he
makes, but the results of his having sordid ends in view would
be to narrow the field of his efforts, and exercise a depressing
effect upon his activities. The true man of science has no
such expression in his vocabulary as 'useful knowledge.' His
domain is as wide as Nature itself, and he best fulfills his mission
when he leaves to others the task of applying the knowledge
he gives to the world."
It seems certain that scientists for all time will find one
of their great exemplars and inspirations in Louis Pasteur.
Unsurpassed in his scientific methods and accomplishments,
he was likewise clear-thinking and high-minded in his devotion
to his calling as investigator. The anecdote is familiar: offered
the post of national supervisor of the silk industry at a then-
princely salary per year, he declined, remarking that "such
a step would be beneath the dignity and calling of a scientist."
In modern parlance, he declined the calling into technocracy!
Whatever the guilt which may attach to the devises called
instruments of war, whatever the results of machine invention
and machine production, whatever the credit for undreamed
speeds of communication and travel, whatever the future of
radio and television and air travel—pure science can deny the
guilt, and must forego the credit: her dealings were and are
with the fundamentals, not with devisings, or recombinations,
or with any of the honorable or wicked applications of the
technocrats. Her province is with the facts of nature, the
facts as they are, and were, untold ages ago: the facts as they
were in the proterozoic, the palaeozoic, mesozoic, and cenozoic—
long before man was here to observe, and longer before he
invented anything.
And here our discussion blends into the second of three
of the suits often brought against science, and about which
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I am venturing to say something this evening. I refer to the
specific or implied injury which scientific revelations have
presumably done to different theories as to the nature of things,
to long-held and preciously-valued personal philosophies, to
ecclesiastical tenets or creeds, and consequently to human
peace-of-mind and serenity. In so far as these last have
depended on unfounded tradition, on mere usage, on superficial
custom and habit, on superstition, on assumed revelation or
inspiration in the field of ideas and beliefs, or on childish
preferences, the contentions, i. e., the truths which have been
established by science, may easily have been damaging, and
deep wounds have hurt. The claim is usually advanced that
science has concocted new facts, created laws de novo, out of
its own powers and suitable to its own whims, in part, even,
mischievously: it has toyed with the holy and sacred.
Such as see the matter thus must reflect that truth never
changes, that the facts of science are not new, but eternal.
They should slowly read the words of that poetic thinker
who, in the opening words of a sonnet, has said:
"Fear not to go where fearless Science leads,
Who holds the Keys of God. What reigning light
Thine eyes discern in that surrounding night
Whence we have come . . .
Thy Soul shall never find that wrong is right."
Put in other words, Ecclesiasticus need not worry about
true scientists when he says, "That which hath been, is that
which shall be: and that which hath been done, is that which
shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun."
Scientists realize those facts already: they are simply that
minority of people in general who feel the universe as a whole,
and the minutiae, even to the size of electrons, to be genuinely
interesting, and spontaneously give their time and strength,
their lives, to finding out not new things, for there are none,
but rather facts and relationships which have never been
noticed or formulated before.
Thus while the scientific group in the first place resents the
charge that its members are identical with the inventors and
technologists, they, in the second place, vigorously resent the
accusation that they create new forces, either as allies of the
evil one or as collaborators with Almighty God. If they pray
at all, it is in these words: "Open Thou mine eyes that I may
see,"—the facts and the laws of the ages.
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May I comment briefly on one other of the numerous
criticisms not infrequently voiced as judgments against science?
Rather than attempt to define or describe its nature, let me
quote:
"Every province of human interest has been brought
under scientific classification, so that nearly all thought is
now cast in 'general ideas.' This mode of thinking ignores
individuality and sees in men and things only units of a
class. For this reason, man is content with countless
repetitions of the same form because his class idea is
realized if it find in each object the few characteristics
common to the group."
After citing a few examples by way of illustrating the
foregoing contention, the commentator continues:
"The world has been filled with these ugly forms
made in the name of art, but they only bear witness that
science has subdued the earth and now holds undisputed
sway."
Then he adds as a separate paragraph:
"Not only has it driven art into the background,
but it has misrepresented its character."
And further on:
"As I have said above, science is largely responsible
for the widespread misconceptions of and indifference
to art."
Let me at once add that the context of the above quotation
fully explains that the writer does not mean that science is
anything less than invaluable in its own way. He does mean
that a body of students who have been disciplined in the
precision methods of science are perhaps permanently injured
as to their easy grasp of the highly visionary and imaginative
practices which are vital to the artist. While trying to estimate
the degree to which science is thus innocent or guilty as regards
the fine arts, one must not forget that they have very different
goals, at least when one has in mind the ultimate ambition of
each. They do not pretend to be more than supplementary
to each other, or to coincide save with respect to the most
elementary beginnings of each. In all their separately diag-
nostic features, they strive and operate in very different fields,
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with different ends in view, and make very unlike contributions
to the mental and spiritual life of man. Art is characterized
by breadth; generally by mass effects: it feeds the spirit of
man, it works through his emotions, it amplifies his vision, and
enlarges his soul by bringing his imagination into play. In a
degree which statistical data could never secure, art lets a
person attain a depth of feeling and appreciation which he
would otherwise never experience.
The method of science, on the other hand, uses the mind as
a tool, and by insistence on precision, on uniformity, on endless
repetition and calibration, it brings about a state of mind
which demands absolute and generally tangible truth, so far
as this is humanly attainable: it engenders a dislike, an intoler-
ance of haze and fog, of crude approximations, of half truths:
dreams have little place in the disciple of science. In all these
ways, then it must be conceded that the precision of science not
only does not contribute to imaginative art, but, in a real
degree, fosters a spirit which is inimical to art.
But, so far as guilt is to be assigned, so far as responsibility
in the matter goes, is it not a matter of exchange of courtesies?
Each of these fields of human interest and devotion says to the
other, "The same to you, my dear Madam, or Sir!" This
must have always been so: for even the deference which must
be given to age hardly plays any part here, so ancient are
both habits of human thought. The "general, inclusive
effect" which art seeks, is hardly less than an abhorrence to
science, and the exactness of science stands in the way of
emotional art. The artist throws himself, his very soul, into
the picture or the statue—his result is an alloy of his imagina-
tion, his vision, his materials and tools, and himself: on the
other hand, the product of the scientist must be unbiased,
impartial, impersonal, concrete.
Fortunately, human interests are hybrid to such degree that
both art and science can be understood, and tolerated, and
fostered in the make-up of the single individual. This is an
instance of dual-personality, and caution should be exercised
lest we let either the play of imagination and vision, or the
insistence on accuracy be crowded out by, or confused with the
other. It is fortunate, let me say further, that, "in spite of
ourselves," we constantly experience and earnestly propagate
the instinct which enjoys art on the one hand and simultaneously
insists on scientific accurac)7.
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In a not too clear-cut way, I have tried to designate three
of the commoner articulations with human affairs at which
science is often called into court as an offender against the
material, or intellectual, or spiritual welfare of human kind.
As regards the first, we insist that there is a clear distinction
between the investigator and discoverer of elemental truth,
the truth which resides in the nature of things, and the person
who makes permutations and combinations of the facts seen
first by the true research worker, facts sought and found for
their own sake. The technologist depends on the research
worker for the secrets on which his devises rest, but the scientist
may not be held responsible for either the good or evil, or the
number of machines his brother-inventor creates.
As regards perversion of man's intellectual integrity, the
accusers of the scientific observer as an agent in compelling
them to modify their long-established opinions, in any field
whatever, must always be admonished that America was here
millions of years before Columbus discovered its shores: that
there is nothing new under the sun: truth is eternal. It is not
changed by shutting one's eyes to it, it is not created by any man,
scientists or otherwise; but the soul of no man was ever washed
and saved by stubborn attendance at the shrine of ignorance.
In the third place, while man's spiritual nature is not
amenable to calculation or measurement, or reducible to
formula, while it does leave solid ground and fact, and finds
easier expression in the unconfined methods of art, where the
limits imposed by experienced truth do not hold, we should
not feel that art and science are contending for the same
territory in human nature. Each in its place, art giving vision,
and science precision, as has been said, are each vital constituents
of man's every-day needs.
Finally, while fully aware that, as in the human body many a
structure besides the heart or brain is easily a vital organ, so in
the material, and intellectual, and spiritual departments of our
lives we needs must feed in green pastures of various sorts, and
draw inspirations and satisfactions from many different fields;
yet, on the present occasion we pronounce our belief in the
innocence of pure science and its motives: our emphasis is on
the unlimited contribution which science makes to human
thought and philosophy: and we endorse the words of John
Dewey, when he says, "The future of our civilization depends
-upon the widening spread and deepening hold of the scientific
habit of mind."
